Dismissal of Government Employees Under Federal and New York Security Risk Laws by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 32 
Number 1 Volume 32, December 1957, Number 
1 
Article 7 
May 2013 
Dismissal of Government Employees Under Federal and New York 
Security Risk Laws 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1957) "Dismissal of Government Employees Under Federal and New York Security 
Risk Laws," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 32 : No. 1 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss1/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
This provision minimizes the dangers inherent in defense counsel's
inability to see the entire statement, by subjecting the trial court's
excisions to appellate scrutiny.
It should be noted that the statute, in providing alternative
courses of action for the trial judge, does not adopt the strict ruling
of the majority opinion which requires dismissal of the criminal action
when the government elects not to produce a statement or report for
the inspection and use of the defendant.45 The course of action to be
pursued by the trial judge must depend upon the importance of the
testimony, the documents to be produced, and other facts and
circumstances.
Conclusion
There has developed, in recent years, a strong tendency to allow
liberal discovery in civil actions. However, this tendency should be
strongly controlled in criminal prosecutions. The highest court of
the State of New Jersey recently stated:
In criminal proceedings long experience has taught the courts that often dis-
covery will lead not to honest fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury and
the suppression of evidence.4 6
It is submitted that it is far easier for a perjured witness or a
fabricated defense to instill only a reasonable doubt in the minds of a
jury, than it is to balance the weight of a civil plaintiff's evidence.
A
DISMISSAL OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES UNDER FEDERAL
AND NEW YORK SECURITY RISK LAWS
Introduction
There is general agreement that no disloyal citizen should be
employed in government. How to achieve this end, however, is one
of the great controversies of our time. Some have criticized the cur-
rent loyalty and security programs as infringements on civil liberties;
others claim that by them, our system of government is being under-
45 "We hold that the criminal action must be dismissed when the Govern-
ment, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce,
for the accused's inspection and for admission in evidence, relevant statements
or reports in the possession of government witnesses touching the subject
matter of their testimony at the trial." Jencks v. United States, supra note 41,
at 672.
46 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953).
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mined. The problem presented to the courts of maintaining the
balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of
government forms the basis of this discussion.
In approaching the problem it must be remembered that there is
a fundamental difference between the disloyal employee, who is seek-
ing the destruction of our government, and the loyal, but unreliable,
employee. It should also be remembered that government employ-
ment is a privilege which should be extended only to those meeting
all the requirements as determined by the government.1 It is im-
portant that legislation in this area provide the employee with the
fullest measure of procedural protection, while not relinquishing any
part of the protection accorded to government.2
The Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912 3 lays down the procedure to
be followed for dismissals from the federal service. It prohibits sus-
pension or removal except for such cause as will promote the efficiency
of the service. The Act provides for notification of the charges;
reasonable time in which to answer; and a hearing within the dis-
cretion of the removing officer.4 Broader protection is granted to
veterans employed by the govermuent by Section 14 of the Veterans
Preference Act,8 passed in 1944, which requires a thirty-day waiting
period prior to any suspension and appeal in all cases to the Civil
Service Commission.6 These two Acts dealing with tenure and dis-
charge provide the basis of dismissal in the suitability program of the
Civil Service Commission.7
The loyalty and security programs, for the most part, began with
the Hatch Act of 1939 8 although loyalty problems date as far back
as the Civil War.9 Prior to Section 9A of this Act, questions into
political beliefs were considered beyond the proper scope of inquiry.'0
Since 1939 and throughout World War II, loyalty acts of
limited nature were enacted and executive orders," also operating in
a limited way, were issued; but no uniform system as to standards
of loyalty or procedures to effect removal was established.
In 1947, Executive Order 9835 12 grouped many of these smaller
programs together into what was later known as the Loyalty
Program.' 3 The order made a loyalty investigation mandatory for
I See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; United Pub. Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
2 Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 FED. RzG. 2489 (1953).
337 STAT. 555 (1912), 5 U.S.C. §652 (1952).
4 Ibid.
558 STAT. 390 (1944), 5 U.S.C. §863 (1952).
6 Ibid.
7 RFPORT OF CommissiO oN GOVERNMENT SECURITY 20, 81-82 (1957).
8 53 STAT. 1148 (1939), 5 U.S.C. § 118j (1952).
9 See Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954).
1o REPORT OF ComitssIoN ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY 5 (1957).
"I Id. at 6.
1212 FED. REG. 1935 (1947).
13 See Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 543 (1956).
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all those entering service as well as those already serving the
government. 14 A finding of disloyalty was originally required as a
test for dismissal and for denial of employment, but was modified to
a finding of "reasonable doubt" as to loyalty.15 It is from this back-
ground that the present security program stems.'5
Federal Security Risk Law
The Federal Security Risk Law,"' enacted in 1950, is the latest
security act directed at federal employment. This Act is aimed at
the elimination of security risks whether they be disloyal or merely
careless in their employment.' The Act authorizes the summary
suspension of a federal officer or employee ".... when deemed neces-
sary in the interest of national security" 19 and is the basis for the
present security program.20 The Act applies to eleven agencies 21 and
was intended originally to supplement the then existing loyalty pro-
gram.2 2  The head of the agency or department is given complete
discretion to suspend summarily without pay any employee deemed
a security risk. Within thirty days after suspension, the agency must
send written notice of the charges, within the limits of security, to
the employee.
The suspended employee has the right to a hearing by the agency
concerned, and, in the event the decision is adverse, a review of the
decision by the agency head.2 3  Further provisions of the Act allow
the employee dismissed as a security risk to seek employment in other
government agencies provided the Civil Service Commission first
determines his fitness.2 4
This law acts as a limitation on the existing civil service laws
providing for the dismissal of federal employees. 25  Section 3 of the
Act permits the Executive to extend the provisions of the statute to
14 Exec. Order 9835, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947).
'
5 Exec. Order 10241, 16 FED. REG. 3690 (1951).
161n 1955, by Public Law 304, Congress established the Commission on
Government Security whose duty it was to study the present security program
in an effort to render it effective for the protection and maintenance of national
security. See REORT oF CommissiON oN GOVERNMENT SECURITY (1957).
1764 STAT. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. §22-1 (1952).
is S. REP. No. 2158, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (1950).
19 See note 17 supra.
2 0 REPORT OF CoMMISSi N oN GovmNmENT SECURTuY 53 (1957).
2164 STAT. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (1952). They are: the Secretary
of State; Commerce; Defense; the Army; the Navy; the Air Force; the
Treasury; Attorney General; Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman,
National Security Resources Board; the Director, National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics.
22 S. REP. No. 2158, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (1950).
23 64 STAT. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1- (1952).
24 Ibid.
25 See text at notes 3 to 7, supra.
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any department or agency when he deems it necessary in the interests
of national security.
In 1953, by executive order,2 6 the Federal Security Risk Law
was extended to all departments and agencies. The order directs the
head of each department or agency to adopt an effective program to
insure "... . that the employment and retention in employment of any
civilian officer or employee... is clearly consistent with the interests
of national security." 2 Under the extension all departments and
agencies of the government are declared security agencies and are
granted the power of summary suspension.28
The executive order establishes a new procedure to protect the
government from infiltration of subversives. All employees are in-
vestigated in varying degrees-relative to the effect their position
could have on national security.2 9 The loyalty program created by
Executive Order 9835 is revoked 30 by the new executive order thereby
removing the stigma of disloyalty from future dismissals. The
government can now remove employees who, although loyal, consti-
tute security risks.
Section 8 of the executive order establishes the criteria for de-
termining whether an employee is a security risk.
Although retaining the criterion "evidence of disloyalty" 31 as a
carry-over from the prior program, the new program's criteria in-
clude additional elements which apply to security. For example, this
section provides inter alia the following standard: ". . . any facts
which furnish reason to believe that the individual may be subjected
to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause him to act con-
trary to the best interests of the national security." 32
Some of the provisions of this section, however, are similar to
the criteria established by the Civil Service Commission to determine
suitability.33 Thus, there exists an overlap into the suitability area.
This overlap provides agencies with an opportunity to summarily dis-
miss an employee when his dismissal would be more proper under the
provisions of the Civil Service Commission which provide him with
greater safeguards.
The Supreme Court found in Cole v. Young,34 decided in 1956,
that the presidential extension of the Federal Security Risk Law to
all federal employees was beyond the scope intended by Congress.
In reversing the dismissal of an inspector with the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, the Court stated that since the test
26 Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 FED. REG. 2489 (1953).271d. §2.
28 Id. §1.
29 Exec. Order No. 10450, § 3, 18 FED. REG. 2489, 2491 (1953).301d. § 12, 18 FED. Rm. at 2492.
31 Exec. Order No. 10450, § 8, 18 FED. REG. 2489, 2491-92 (1953).
32 Id. at 2491.
335 C.F.R. § 2.106 (Supp. 1957).
34351 U.S. 536 (1956).
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was employment consistent with national security, the government is
required to show some relation between the position of the employee
and national security. Justice Harlan declared:
In view of the stigma attached to persons dismissed on loyalty grounds, the
need for procedural safeguards seems even greater than in other cases, and we
will not lightly assume that Congress intended to take away those safeguards
in the absence of some overriding necessity, such as exists in the case of
employees handling defense secrets.85
The Court referred to the fact that only eleven agencies, all directly
concerned with national security, were enumerated by Congress.
Therefore, the Court reasoned that national security was used in the
Act in the limited sense 36 and, consequently, that the President could
not by executive order change the intent of Congress to "general
security." The fact that the Act provided for the re-employment of
persons discharged as security risks 37 by other government agencies
indicates that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to all govern-
ment agencies. If it did apply to all agencies, those who were security
risks in one agency would of necessity be security risks in any other
agency under the Act. The decision gravely affected the security
program both as to new applicants and those already employed.38
The program is now limited only to those positions which in
themselves can be related to national security and not to all the
agencies and positions of the government. Legislation to fill this gap
in the security program has been proposed.3 9 But, until Congress
acts, there are to be no proceedings against those in non-security
positions.
40
New York Security Risk Law
New York State, similarly concerned with the peril of subversive
infiltration within the ranks of state employees, in 1951 enacted a
Security Risk Law. 41 The purpose of the Act is to provide a means
35 Id. at 546-47.
86 The act ". . . relates only to those activities which are directly concerned
with the Nation's safety, as distinguished from the general welfare ... " Id.
at 543.
3764 STAT. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (1952); S. REP. No. 2158, 81st
Cong. 2d Sess. (1950).
38 See N.Y. Times, June 15, 1956, p. 14, col. 1; REPORT OF COMmissION ON
GOvERNMENT SECURITY 35-40 (1957).
39 H.R. 11721, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. (1956) ; H.R. 11841, 84th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1956).
40 N.Y. Times, June 15, 1956, p. 14, col. 1.
41 Laws of N.Y. 1951, c. 233, as amended Laws of N.Y. 1953, c. 26, Laws
of N.Y. 1954, c. 105. This act has been extended on a year-to-year basis. See
Laws of N.Y. 1957, c. 176. There are 13 other states which have enacted
various forms of security risk laws. See SPECIM. COMMITTE OF THE Asso-
CIATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THE FEDERAL-SECURITY PROGRAM 211 n.167
(1956).
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whereby security risks may be removed from positions in which they
may endanger national or state security. The New York Security
Risk Law calls for summary suspension of all employees from se-
curity agencies and positions when, after proper investigation,
".. . reasonable grounds exist for the belief that, because of doubtful
trust and reliability, the employment of such persons ... would en-
danger the security or defense of the nation and the state." 42
Prior to the enactment of the New York Security Risk Law
subversion in government employment was combated through the use
of the general procedure of Section 22 of the Civil Service Law.
43
This section makes provisions for notice, hearing and appeal prior
to any removals.
Section 12-a of the Civil Service Law, which disqualifies from
public employment any person who advocates overthrow of govern-
ment by force or violence, formed the basis for such removal. How-
ever, the procedure was slow in operation, 4 4 the basis of removal was
difficult to prove,45 and there were no provisions for the removal of the
loyal employee, who still was a security risk. Another difficulty lay
in the fact that Sections 25 and 26-a of the Civil Service Law pre-
vented government authorities from asking an employee questions
concerning his political beliefs as a test of fitness for office. In Adler
v. Wilson,4 6 however, the court held that these sections did not apply
to questions concerning membership in the Communist Party. The
New York Security Risk Law provides for a full, but expeditious
hearing. Furthermore, under Section 5, any employee suspended
under the Act must be informed of the reason for such action and
of the source of any evidence, without violating confidences. The
dismissed employee is then given thirty days to offer evidence or affi-
davits to the agency showing why he should be reinstated to duty.47
After the thirty-day period, the agency finally determines whether he
shall be transferred, removed, or returned to duty.48 Any person
believing himself to be aggrieved by the agency decision has the right
to appeal within twenty days to the State Civil Service Commission
which is given complete power to review the case.
49
42 Laws of N.Y. 1951, c. 233, § 5.
43 Removal of any civil service employee could be accomplished only through
the procedure of Section 22 of the New York Civil Service Law.
44N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw § 22(2). "The person whose removal is sought shall
have written notice of such proposed removal and of reasons therefore . . .
and shall be allowed a reasonable time for answering the same in writing."
Ibid.
4s Knowledge must be present before the statute will be applicable. Lederman
v. Board of Educ., 276 App. Div. 527, 530, 96 N.Y.S.2d 466, 470 (2d Dep't),
aff'd sub non. Thompson v. Wallin, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E.2d 806 (1950), aff'd
mb norn. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
46 282 App. Div. 418, 123 N.Y.S.2d 655 (3d Dep't 1953).
47 Laws of N.Y. 1951, c. 233, § 5.
48 Ibid.
49 Id. §6.
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The Civil Service Commission determines what is a security
agency or security position and this determination is subject to judi-
cial review.50 Among the evidence that may be considered to deter-
mine a security risk under Section 7 of the Act is "membership in
any organization or group found by the Civil Service Commission to
be subversive."
It was hoped that this Act would achieve its ends ... with the
least possible encroachment upon the freedom of expression... with
extensive safeguards to protect them [state employees] from possible
abuse." 51
The New York State Security Risk Law is modeled on the fed-
eral statute 52 but has some important differences. The most impor-
tant distinction is the right of an aggrieved employee to appeal to the
State Civil Service Commission from an agency's determination.
However, the Federal Act contains an underlying weakness in
that the final decision in all cases is made by the same agency which
initially suspended the employee as a security risk. This weakness is
corrected by the New York Act which provides for a hearing before
an impartial commission which will bring about a standardization of
decisions, and, in addition, should provide greater safeguards for the
employee.
Furthermore, the two Acts differ in their scope. The New York
Act empowers the Civil Service Commission to determine that an
agency is a security agency whenever its functions are ".... necessary
to the security or defense of the nation and the state . . ." 53 and
permits judicial review of this determination. However, the Federal
Act names the applicable agencies, 54 which later were extended by
presidential order to include all federal agencies. 55 The application
of this order to all federal agencies was later narrowed by the Supreme
Court decision in Cole v. Young 5 which stated that it required more
than a mere showing that the security risk was an employee of a
government agency. It must also be shown that this position, which
the employee holds, could directly affect national security.
Although the federal and the state Acts are not identical, the
State Civil Service Commission has nevertheless adopted the federal
view in reviewing state dismissals. However, in 1953, the President
of the Civil Service Commission, J. Edward Conway, had stated that
the intent of the legislature, and the original interpretation of the
commission, was merely to require that the employment be in a se-
curity agency or position, and he made no mention of the additional
5 0 Id. §3.
51 Governor's Memorandum, 1951 N.Y. LF~is. ANNUAL 316, 317.
52 Id. at 316.
53 Laws of N.Y. 1951, c. 233, § 2.
5464 STAT. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. §22-1 (1952).
5 Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 FED. REG. 2489 (1953).56351 U.S. 536 (1956).
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requirement, that is, showing that the employment would endanger
the security or defense of the nation and the state.
Recently, a stenographer employed by the New York City De-
partment of Hospitals was discharged pursuant to Section 5 of the
Security Risk Law. On appeal, the Civil Service Commission ordered
that she be reinstated because the Department of Hospitals had not
established that her employment in such position would endanger the
security or defense of the nation and the state.51 While the commis-
sion may be following the narrow road cut by the Supreme Court,
a more restricted approach than that intended by the legislature,
nevertheless the results reached are sound. It is reasonable to assume
that if one is to be discharged in the interests of national security,
some relation should exist between the position and national security.
Lerner v. Casey
The constitutionality of the New York Security Risk Law was
tested recently in the case of Lerner v. Casey." The New York
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal under the Act of an employee
of the New York City Transit Authority who, when asked if he
was presently a member of the Communist Party, pleaded the fifth
amendment. In 1953, the Transit Authority had been declared a
security agency by the Civil Service Commission. In September,
1954, Lerner, a subway conductor, was directed by his superiors to
appear before the Department of Investigation of the City of New
York. At that time he refused to answer questions relating to his
present membership in the Communist Party on the ground that the
answers would tend to incriminate him. Later hearings were held at
which petitioner, represented by counsel, continued in his refusal to
answer.
Lerner was then suspended by the Transit Authority and given
notice of the cause of his discharge as required by Section 5 of the
New York Security Risk Law.59 The thirty-day period, which was
provided for the employee to show reasons why he should be restored
to duty, elapsed without any statement having been received from the
petitioner or his attorney. The Authority in reviewing the suspension
found that reasonable grounds existed for the belief that Lerner was
of doubtful trust and reliability. Therefore, the employment of Lerner
as a subway conductor endangered the security of the nation and the
state, and, as a result of this finding, he was discharged. Thereafter,
the petitioner failed to appeal the Transit Authority's decision. Thus,
97 Miriam Reif, New York State Civil Service Commission Opinion (May
10, 1957), Order (June 13, 1957).
582 N.Y.2d 355, 141 N.E.2d 533 (1957).
G Laws of N.Y. 1951, c. 233.
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the Civil Service Commission never had an opportunity to pass on
Lerner's position in relation to national security.60
Lerner brought an Article 78 proceeding 6 ' against the Transit
Authority to compel his reinstatement. The respondent's motion to
dismiss was granted and subsequently affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in a five-to-two opinion.
Preliminarily, the Court determined that the Transit Authority
was properly subject to the New York Security Risk Law because
of the vital function of the subway system in maintaining the welfare
of both the city and the state.62 Lerner's refusal to answer questions
as to present membership in the Communist Party was held to be
"evidence of doubtful trust and reliability" constituting grounds for
discharge under the New York Security Risk Law. Pointing out
that his discharge was due not to his refusal to answer but to the
doubt created by his refusal to answer, the Court declared that merely
pleading the fifth amendment should not erase this doubt. An em-
ployee owes a duty of trust and loyalty to his employer.63 His re-
fusal to respond when questioned concerning his conduct is inconsis-
tent with this duty. An employee, invoking his constitutional privi-
lege, destroys the confidence essential to such a relationship and
creates a suspicion regarding his loyalty.
Turning to the constitutionality of the New York Security Risk
Act, the Court held the Act contained the necessary safeguards to
insure due process and hence was constitutional. The majority opin-
ion distinguished the facts from those in the case of Slochower v.
Board of Higher Educ.6 4 There the Supreme Court held unconsti-
tutional Section 903 of the New York City Charter which provided
for the dismissal of any city employee who invoked the fifth amend-
ment to avoid answering any questions relating to his official conduct.
Slochower, a Brooklyn College professor, pleaded the fifth amendment
before a congressional committee investigating subversion and was
summarily dismissed. The Supreme Court, in reversing the New
York Court of Appeals, declared: "The privilege against self-
incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise
could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt or a con-
clusive presumption of perjury." 65 It is worthy to note that under
the construction placed on Section 903 by the New York Court of
Appeals there was no implied presumption of guilt in the refusal to
60 Lerner v. Casey, 2 N.Y.2d 355, 361, 141 N.E.2d 533, 535 (1957); see
McKay, Constitutional Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1358, 1360 (1956).
61 The statutory proceeding against a body or officer which abolishes the
classification, writs, and orders of certiorari to review mandamus and prohibition.
62 See New York City Transit Auth. v. Loos, 2 M.2d 733, 738, 154 N.Y.S.2d
209, 214 (1956).
63 See Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) . Christal v.
Police Comm'n, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939).
64 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
65 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557 (1956).
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answer, but the exercise of the privilege itself was the basis for
discharge. 66
In the Lerner case the Court of Appeals noted that the questions
concerned the petitioner's present loyalty before a city inquiry, whereas
Slochower had been questioned concerning his 1942 activities by a
federal committee. Furthermore, Lerner was afforded an opportunity
for an agency hearing and appeal in contrast to Slochower's summary
dismissal.6 7
The dissent argued that the exercise of a constitutional privilege
can not be made the basis of discharge and declared that such a dis-
missal was arbitrary and violative of due process. The wording of
the Act prescribed "evidence" of a security risk, but the dissent denied
that remaining silent meets this requirement.
68
The individual's privilege against self-incrimination is one of our
fundamental civil liberties,69 although often subject to grave criti-
cism. 70 The individual's privilege of government employment, on the
other hand, is one conditioned by a waiver of some of the rights
granted under the Constitution. 71 To what extent a government
employee waives his constitutional rights in regard to his privilege
against self-incrimination is a question often before the courts.7 2 The
Supreme Court has held these rights and privileges granted under the
Constitution are not absolute but must be balanced with the actions
of government in order to protect a democratic society.
73
It is generally held that an employee has the obligation to answer
questions by his employer concerning his employment. The Supreme
Court decided in Garner v. Board of Pub. Works 74 that an employee
may be discharged for failing to execute an affidavit as to his past or
present knowing membership in the Communist Party. It stated:
Past conduct may well relate to present fitness; past loyalty may have a rea-
sonable relationship to present and future trust. Both are commonly inquired
into in determining fitness for both high and low positions in private industry
and are no less relevant in public employment.7 5
66 See Note, 31 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 78 (1956).
67 Lerner v. Casey, 2 N.Y.2d 355, 371, 141 N.E.2d 533, 541 (1957) (dictum).
6 8 Id. at 373, 141 N.E.2d at 543 (dissenting opinion of Fuld, J.).
69 See GRIsWoLD, THE FIFT:H AMENDMENT TODAY (1955); Williams,
Problems of the Fifth Amendment, 24 FORDHAm L. REv. 19 (1955) ; Corwin,
The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH.
L. REv. 1 (1930).
70 See Knox, Self Incrimination, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 139 (1925).
7' See Christal v. Police Comm'n, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939);
Faxon v. School Comm., 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954).
72 See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) ; Christal
v. Police Comm'n, note 71 supra.
,3 See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; United Pub. Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
74341 U.S. 716 (1951).
75 Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720 (1951).
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This position was affirmed in Adler v. Board of Educ.7 6 wherein the
Court stated that to determine one's fitness, past or present conduct
may properly be considered.
In Wieman v. Updegraff,77 the Court declared unconstitutional
an Oklahoma statute making membership in certain subversive organ-
izations alone grounds for denying state employment. Without dis-
tinguishing between knowing and ignorant membership, the Court
held that the statute denied the employee of due process. This case
establishes that constitutional privileges would apply to government
employees, whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is arbitrary. The
Slochower case 78 adds that termination of employment without bene-
fit of a hearing for invoking the privilege against self-incrimination
at a congressional hearing violates due process.
Another recent Supreme Court decisio'n, although not concern-
ing public employment, can be compared to the Lerner case. The
case of Konigsberg v. State Bar 79 concerned the denial of admittance
to practice law in California courts for refusing to answer questions
concerning moral character. The Court declared that, absent any
previous statute requiring disclosure, the state may not impute dis-
loyalty to mere silence. Further, it stated: ". . . it is our judgment
that the inferences of bad moral character which the Committee at-
tempted to draw from Konigsberg's refusal to answer questions about
his political affiliations and opinions are unwarranted." 8 0
The Supreme Court has granted Lerner a hearing on his appli-
cation for certiorari.8 1
Conclusion
Mr. Justice Clark remarked in the Slochower case: "The problem
of balancing the State's interest in the loyalty of those in its service
with the traditional safeguards of individual rights is a continuing
one." 82 This problem of balance exists in the area of government
employment on both the federal and state levels, and is a problem
which extends to most activities of government. It is the duty of
the courts to insure that the balance between the rights of the indi-
vidual and the activities of government is maintained.
Many varying opinions have been given as to the significance of
the Supreme Court's decision in the Slochower case.8 3 Nevertheless,
76342 U.S. 485 (1952).
77344 U.S. 183 (1952).
18 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
79353 U.S. 252 (1957).
so Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1957).
8126 U.S.L. WEEK 3116 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1957) (No. 165).
82 See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., supra note 78, at 555.
83 See Note, 31 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 78 (1956) ; Note, 25 FORDHAm L. REv.
526 (1956); Note. 16 MD. L. Rav. 259 (1956).
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NOTES
the decision is a reiteration of two principles of constitutional law:
that the privilege against self-incrimination protects the innocent as
well as the guilty, and that no inference of guilt may be drawn from
its invocation.8 4 In deciding the Slochower case the Supreme Court
interpreted Section 903 as permitting a presumption of guilt from its
invocation, and Slochower's discharge was based upon this presump-
tion. It would seem the very question which existed in that case is
present in the Lerner case. The New York Act requires that in
order to suspend an employee a finding of "evidence of doubt" must
exist. However, a dismissal using the fifth amendment privilege as
evidence is precisely what the Supreme Court prohibited in the
Slochower case. That the legislature intended the invocation of the
fifth amendment be considered as evidence under the Act is doubtful,
but if they did so, the Act is unconstitutional in this application. 5
DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
The administrative process is a necessary part of our modern
government. The growth of modern society with all of the com-
plexities of government, coupled with the cumbersome and dilatory
procedures in our courts, has given rise to the extensive use of ad-
ministrative agencies. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, discussing the dis-
tinction between the administrative and judicial process, stated:
... that although the administrative process has had a different development
and pursues somewhat different ways from those of courts, they are to be
deemed collaborative instrumentalities of justice and the appropriate independ-
ence of each should be respected by the other.1
In another opinion, Justice Frankfurter commented:
Unlike courts which are concerned primarily with the enforcement of private
rights . . . administrative agencies are predominantly concerned with enforcing
public rights although private interests may thereby be affected. To no small
degree administrative agencies for the enforcement of public rights were es-
tablished by Congress because more flexible and less traditional procedures
84See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); Slochower v.
Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
sr If this Act imposed an absolute duty upon employees to answer questions
relating to their official conduct by a proper authority it would probably be
held constitutional. See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., note 84 supra,
Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
1 United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
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